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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
DETERMINATION OF THE PENALTY-
BY JUDGE OR JURY?
A NY determination as to the person or persons who should haveL the power and the duty to assess the penalty against a
violator of the penal law can be made only after a consideration of
the objects and methods of punishment. These are inextricably
involved in any discussion of the practicability of placing this duty
on one group of men or on another. It may be accepted as basic
that a particular group lacking the ability to select a punishment
which will accomplish the purposes for which the punishment
is assessed should not be permitted to continue in the responsibility
if some other agency of the state exists or could be created which
would be better qualified to discharge the responsibility. Therefore,
the initial inquiry must be with regard to the objects of punishment
and the knowledge requisite for an intelligent determination of the
penalty by whatever group or agency may be designated.
The Legislature of Texas has declared concisely that the objects
of punishment in this State shall be "to suppress crime and to
reform the offender."' In other words, the primary good to be
attained by means of punishment inflicted by the State is that
society will be protected from similar invasions of its peace and
order by either the person convicted or by others who might be
tempted to commit the same crime but for the fear of punishment
similar to that inflicted upon the prior offender. To be attained
simultaneously with the suppression of crime is the reform of the
offender, the secondary object, if possible." Numerous other theo-
2Tnc P, . CODE (1925) art. 2.
2 This interpretation was stated by the chairman of the Committee on Criminal Law
and Procedure of the Texas Bar Association in his annual report in 1940. (1940) 3
TEX. BAR J. 328, 329. The same view, though not an interpretation of the Texas statute,
was.expressed in an editorial, A Proposed Sentencing Commission (1927) OUTLOOK 484.
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ries of punishment formulated by penologists and sociologists"
need not be discussed here in view of the unambiguous statement
by the Texas Legislature. Such a legislative declaration of public
policy does, however, raise a further question as to what factors
must be considered by this group designated to determine the pun.
ishment in order to insure the effectuation of the policy. The
variety of factors to which reference should be made in the assess-
ment of punishment was well stated by Edward Livingston, a fore-
most penologist of an earlier day, from whose works much of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was taken, when he said in his
Code of Procedure:
"In selecting the particular kind of punishment.., attention should
be paid to the sex, the constitution, the fortune, the education, and the
habits of life of the offender. It is apparent that hard labor is not the
same punishment, when applied in the same degree, to one used all his
life to bodily exertion, and to another brought up in literary pursuits;
to a robust man, and to a delicate woman. That incapacity to be elected
to public office will be a greater penalty to one used to public life, than
to one whose pursuits and education have fitted only to his own affairs;
and that the possessor of a large fortune will consider a moderate fine as
no punishment."' 4
It is apparent that to achieve the purpose for which the punish-
ment is inflicted, the agency which assesses the punishment must
know, in addition to the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime, the character of the offender, his educational back-
3 Materials relating to the various theories of punishment are limitless and con-
flicting. The sharp contrast in the opinions on the subject is clearly shown by a com.
parison of the article by Lewis, Punishment (1901) PROC INGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTrON 147, with the article by Bernard, Crime and
Punishment (1923) 239 QUART. REv. 58, 70. The former cites the famous statement
of the British judge when he sentenced a horse thief to be hanged, "I hang you not for
stealing a horse, but that horses may not be stolen," but the article concludes that it is
seldom that men are deterred from committing crime by the thought of legal punish-
ment. Bernard, in the latter article, states, "The study of parental discipline in a well-
ordered nursery would be a useful training for some of the sentimental philanthropists.
The law of love punishes a naughty child, not only for his own good, but in order that
his good: little brothers and sisters may not be seduced into naughty ways by his bad
example. To say that nursery discipline does not recognize punishment as a deterrent is
nonsense, and yet the law of love is nowhere more tenderly and happily observed."
4 Livingston, Code of Procedure (1825) art. 436, reprinted in THE COMPLErE WORKS
oF EDWARD LrvINcSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 185, 298.
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ground, the motivation of his criminal behavior, and the social
significance of the commission of the crime.
Among the several possible persons or groups which might be
designated to assess the penalty and whose competence to punish
the offender must be discussed is the jury. Texas, together with
perhaps five or six other states,' provides that the jury shall assess
the penalty in all cases where it is not absolutely fixed by law;' this
is true even though the accused pleads guilty, 7 unless he exercises
the right to waive jury trial, in which case the judge must exercise
the power of fixing the penalty.! But in all cases in which the
offender pleads "not guilty" to a felony charge, the jury alone has
power to determine the punishment, there being no right of waiver
by the accused.' In all cases in which the jury has this duty, the
judge has no power to fix the penalty when the jury fails to assess
one or is unable to agree upon one, or when the punishment fixed
by the jury is not authorized by law."0 In each of these cases the
judge must return the jury to the juryrooi for further delibera-
tions."
In the great majority of other jurisdictions the law- or rule-
making bodies have made the judge responsible for selecting the
punishment, leaving to the jury only the question of whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and if guilty, of what crime. This is
also true in the federal courts 12 and in England. Of course, the
discretion of the judge is in almost every case restricted by the
'Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Virginia.
'TEX. CoDi CalM. PROC. (1925) art. 693.
7 Id., art. 502.
6 Id., art. l0a.
9 There are variations of this method of determining the punishment in cases in
which the sentence is suspended, the accused is placed on probation, or the convicted
person is a juvenile.
10 Williams v. State, 11 Tex. App. 63 (1881) ; Tiger v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. Rep.
614, 197 S. W. 716 (1917).
11 ARK. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 4070: "Court to zix punishment. When a jury find a
verdict of guilty and fail to agree on the punishment to he inflicted, or do not declare
such punishment in their verdict, or if they assess a punishment not authorized by law,
and in all cases of judgment on confession, the court shall assess and declare the
punishment and render judgment accordingly."
12 FED. RULFS Cim. Pnoc. (1946) Rules 31 and 32.
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maximum and minimum punishments prescribed by the state leg-
islatures.
In California the penalty is fixed by neither the judge nor the
jury, this duty being delegated to the Board of Prison Directors
in cases where the punishment to be fixed is imprisonment in the
state prisons." The members of the Board, appointed by the Gov-
ernor, have the power to reconsider any sentence imposed and
increase or diminish it.
I
In spite of the reaction against the Harshness of the old English
criminal law which was manifested in the early ninteenth century
movement toward technical procedure for the protection of the
accused, this tendency did not result in the conferring upon the
jury, rather than upon the judge, the power to fix the penalty.1" The
continuation of such power in the judges is perhaps attributable
to the leadership of the judges themselves in bringing about the
reaction; under the influence of the humanitarian spirit of the
times, they surrounded the accused with protective technicalities
13 Because the California law in the manner of determining punishment seems to be
more progressive than that of any of the other jurisdictions, it is deemed advisable to
reprint herein the pertinent sections of the CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE (Deering, 1941) :
Section 1168: "Every person convicted of a public offense, for which imprisonment.
in any reformatory or State prison is now prescribed by law shall, unless such convicted
person be placed on probation, a new trial granted, or the imposing of sentence sus-
pended, be sentenced to be imprisoned in a State prison, but the court in imposing the
sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment."
Section 3020: "In the case of all persons heretofore or hereafter sentenced under the
provisions of Section 1168 of this Code, the board may determine and redetermine,
after the expiration of six months, from and after the actual commencement of the
imprisonment, what length of time, if any, such person should be imprisoned, unless the
sentence be sooner terminated by commutation or pardon by the Governor of the State."
Section 3023: "The term of the imprisonment shall not exceed the maximum or be
less than the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the public offense of
which such person was sentenced."
Section 3000: "There is, and shall continue to be, in the State Department of
Penology, a division known as the Division of Prison Terms and Paroles. This division
is and shall be under the control of a governing board which is known as the Board of
Prison Terms and Paroles, consisting of a chairman and two other members, each of
whom shall be appointed by the Governor."
14 See Scoville, Evolution of Criminal Procedure (1914) 52 ANNALS ACAD. OF POL.
AND Soc. Sc. 93.
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while retaining for themselves the power to fix the penalty. The
change from the judge to the jury in Texas is difficult to explain.
Under the Spanish civil law there was no jury in criminal cases,
the judge being empowered to determine the guilt of the accused
as well as his punishment. However, in November, 1835, while
Texas was yet under Mexican rule, the Consultation at San Felipe
de Austin adopted this provision:
"Art. VII. All trials shall be by jury; and in criminal cases, the pro-
ceedings shall be regulated and conducted upon the principles of the
common law of England....""
Inasmuch as the common law permitted the judge to determine
the punishment, such thereupon became for a time the procedure in
Texas. Following the formation of the Republic of Texas, the First
Congress in 1836 enacted legislation which made no appreciable
change in the existing practice.'" For the ten years of the Republic
the power of the judge to fix the penalty was not disturbed. The
change to jury determination of the penalty was effected by one
of the first laws passed by the First Legislature of the State of
Texas in 1846, which provided as follows:
"Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Texas that in the trial
of all criminal cases, the jury trying the same, shall find and assess the
amount of the punishment to be inflicted, or the fine to be imposed,
except in capital cases and where the punishment or fine imposed shall
be specifically imposed by law."' 7
The reasons for the adoption of such a provision are still obscure.
Perhaps the democratic trend of the times caused the change; or
abuses of discretion by the judges may have led the Legislature to
prefer an agency for fixing the penalty which presumably would
better represent the ideas of all the people as to the purposes of
punishment. But whatever the basis for the change, the reasons
15 1 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 540.
16 "Sec. 53. All fines and penalties in prosecution for criminal offense, or for the
violation of any penal statute, shall be assessed by the court before whom the offender
may be tried on the return of the verdict of guilty by the jury empanelled in such prose.
cutions." 1 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel, 1898) 1255.
I Tex. Laws 1846, p. 161, 2 LAWS OF TEXAS (Gammel. 1898) 1467.
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must have remained persuasive to the Legislature at the time of the
first codification of criminal procedure in 1856. Although the com-
rhittee appointed at that time to frame a code borrowed freely from
the draft code for Louisiana proposed by Edward Livingston, his
suggested procedure for the assessment of the penalty was not
adopted. Livingston had written in his Code of Procedure, that
"Certain circumstances... attending the commission of the same
kind of offense, may render it more or less immoral, injurious, or diffi-
cult to repress. No legislation can be sufficiently minute to provide for
all the gradations. The deficiency can only be supplied by vesting in
the judge, who applies the law, a discretionary power, within certain
limits, to select the kind of punishment adapted to the case, and to
increase or diminish its degree. The exercise of this discretion forms
one of the most important and difficult functions of the judiciary
power; in practice, it must of necessity be irregular....
Notwithstanding this advice, no change was made in the manner
of assessing the punishment, the Texas procedure begun in 1846
remaining substantially unaffected by the numerous subsequent
codifications.
If abuses of discretion by the trial judges afforded the reason
for the change in 1846, certainly apprehension of such abuses is
no longer justified. After one hundred years judges are not only
better trained in the law but are also equipped with some knowl-
edge of the social sciences, especially criminology and psychology;
moreover, they are more amenable to public criticism than was
their pioneer counterpart. On the other hand, the jury arguably has
become a less appropriate body for this function in view of the
significant increase in the available knowledge which should be
within the reference of those assessing penalties. While it may be
conceded that the education and experience of the average juror
has increased since the days of the Republic, his knowledge of the
relevant social sciences, of the effects of imprisonment, and of the
purposes of punishment remains, perhaps, as meager as it ever was.
18 Livingston, Code of Procedure (1825) art. 431, reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF EDWARD LIvINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (1873) 185, 294.
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Moreover, prospective jurors have such infrequent opportunity to
utilize information of this sort in the performance of the juror's
function, sitting upon one or two cases only once in a period of two
or three years, that there is little incentive for them to acquire
knowledge on the subject of punishment, assuming a desire and an
opportunity for such learning exist. And it is well known that pro-
fessional persons and often those who have had the greater educa-
tional opportunity and are likely to possess the required knowledge
are either exempted from or tend to avoid jury duty.
Even if such specialized information were at the disposal of the
average juror, rules of evidence strictly prohibit the prosecution
from introducing testimony not relevant to the issue of guilt of the
crime charged;" the jury, therefore, never hears of the factors in
the experience of the accused relevant to an enlightened assessment
of punishment, e.g., his education, socio-economic position, char-
acter, past environment, and previous criminal behavior and pun-
ishment. And the rule allowing the prosecution to introduce
evidence of the reputation of the accused for truth and veracity is
of little assistance, since such evidence can be admitted only after
the defendant has attempted to establish his good character, and
this he is unlikely to do when his reputation can be shown to be
particularly reprehensible. As a result the penalty assessed by the
jury can only accidentally accomplish the prescribed purpose of
determining crime inasmuch as none of the factors necessary for a
prediction of further criminal behavior by the accused are likely
to be considered by the jury. And if the statute contemplates that
the penalty shall be assessed for the purpose of deterring the
particular crime in the community as well as by the defendant in
the future, then the jury is less fitted to perform this duty than is
the judge who not only may conduct his own investigation into the
accused's past record, education, and environment but who is also
in a better position to know whether a particular type of crime is,
19 See 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 196; MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW
OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 681.
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or is likely to be, prevalent in the community. Investigation by the
judge for this purpose was recommended by Livingston in his Code,
and such power has come to be conferred upon judges in the
federal courts"0 and a number of other jurisdictions.2'
Assuming that the jury would have access to evidence of the
background, character, and past record of the accused, and that it
could be shown to the jury that the crime in question has been com-
mitted with increasing frequency so as to emphasize the need for
a penalty of deterrent value, it is questionable whether a jury of
ordinary laymen would have the requisite knowledge and experi-
ence to interpret the material presented and to determine a punish-
ment which would have the desired effect. For example, the jurors in
all probability would not be equal to the complex task of fixing
a punishment which would be adequate to deter the commission
of the crime by others and at the same time adjusted to the circum-
stances of an occasional offender who could presumably be cor-
rected with a slight penalty. Although it is arguable that these dual
objectives of punishment are inconsistent, it would seem that the
judge and not the jury could determine a punishment which would
more accurately fulfill the objects for which it is assessed.
20 FED. RULES CRIM. PROC. (1946) Rule 32.
21 N. Y. CRIM. CODE (1945) § 482: "Before rendering judgment or pronouncing
sentence, the court shall cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted
to it, including any reports that may have been made as a result of a mental, psychiatric
or physical examination of the person and may seek any information that will aid the
court in determining the proper treatment of the defendant."
CAL. PEN. CooE (Deering, 1941) § 1192a: "Before judgment is pronounced upon any
person convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the State prison, it shall
be the duty of the court, assisted by the district attorney, to ascertain in a summary
manner, and by such evidence as is obtainable, whether such person has learned and
practiced any mechanical or other trade, and also such other fact to indicate the causes
of the criminal character of such convicted person, or calculated to be of assistance to
the court in determining the proper punishment of such person, or to the State Board
of Prison Directors in the performance of the duties imposed upon it by law, as the
court shall deem proper. It shall be the duty of the judge before whom the convicted
person was tried, and of the district attorney conducting the prosecution, to obtain, and
with the commitment, furnish to the State Board of Prison Directors, in writing, all the
information that can be given in regard to the career, habits, degree of education, age,
nativity, parentage, and previous occupation of such convicted person, together with a
statement to the best of their knowledge, as to whether such per.On was industrious or
not, of good character or not, the nature of his associates and his disposition."
1947]
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Moreover, if the jurors are unable to agree upon the proper pun-
ishment that should be given, the judge has no discretionary power
under the law in Texas to supply a penalty but can only order the
jury to deliberate further. And if the jury is never able to come
to an agreement, then a new trial must be granted just as in a case
in which the jury is never able to agree on the guilt of the accused.2
Therefore, an accused who has been found guilty by the unanimous
vote of the twelve jurors has an undeserved opportunity to escape
conviction and punishment altogether as a result of the several
factors which make a later effective prosecution more difficult.
Finally the argument may be made against allowing the jury to
select the punishment that its determination by the jury is subject,
to a greater extent than would be that by the judge, to the non-
rational factors of emotion and prejudice. The importance of these
factors has been set forth convincingly by Judge Fisher of Illinois
thus:
"Each penalty imposed by the jury is the result of the momentary
whims, sympathies, or prejudices of its members. More often it is a
compromise arrived at by twelve men while in a state of mental con-
fusion induced by a new and unique experience. Their judgment is
influenced by such irrelevant matters as the appearance, demeanor,
and mental operations of the lawyer or of some of the witnesses for or
against the defendant. Race, color and creed not infrequently become
the determining factor in the case."'21
22 Brooks v. State, 4 Tex. App. 567 (1878) ; Doran v. State, 7 Tex. App. 385 (1879);
Williams v. State, 11 Tex. App. 63 (1881) ; Tiger v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. Rep. 614, 197
S. W. 716 (1917).
23 Fisher, A Proposal for a Penal Code - With Procedure to be Governed by Rules
of Court (1944) 39 ILL. L. Rxv. 97,111. Inasmuch as the conclusion reached by Judge
Fisher in this article is that neither the judge nor the jury should be empowered to
determine the penalty, but that it should be determined by some board of specialists, he
cannot be held prejudiced in favor of determination by the judge.
Three recent cases, State v. Young, State v. Riddle, and State v. Jett, tried in the
District Criminal Court of Dallas County, afford an excellent example of the incongruous
results often reached by the jury in assessing penalties. All of the defendants in these
cases were involved together in an escapade of rape and robbery. Severance having been
granted, Young, 27 years old, was the first to be tried. The jury found him guilty of the
crime of rape and imposed the death penalty (Dallas Morning News, June 29, 1946,
§ 2, p. 1, col. 8). Riddle, 19 years of age, was also found guilty of rape and his penalty
was assessed at life imprisonment (Dallas Morning News, Nov. 2, 1946, § 2, p. 1, col. 4).
Jett, 18 years old, upon being found guilty of rape was given a five-year suspended
[Vol. 1
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Although a trial judge can be expected to share the attitude
prevailing in his community toward any minority group, neverthe-
less his experience in the courtroom and his long acquaintance with
the law should enable him more readily to detect appeals to
prejudice or emotion and to be more aware of the effect of such
factors upon the administration of justice.
If it were deemed desirable that legislation be enacted in Texas
transfering the power to determine the punishment from the jury
to the judge, there might be some question as to the constitutionality
of such a statute. In the cases in which the point has been discussed,
the Court of Criminal Appeals has declared by way of dictum that
the Legislature has the power to place the responsibility upon the
judge." In the case of Ex parte Marshall,"' an attack was made
upon the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature26 providing
that the judge should assess the penalty and that the term of im-
prisonment imposed upon the convicted person should correspond
exactly to the minimum and maximum limits set by the Legislature
to that particular offense of which the accused was convicted. The
accused complained that the Texas Constitution in providing that
the right of trial by jury should remain inviolate27 made the de-
termination of the punishment by the jury a matter of right
accruing to the offender and that the Legislature had no power to
allow any other agency to exercise that power. The Court held the
sentence (Dallas Morning News, March 2, 1947, § 2, p. 1, col. 6). Although all three of
the juries impanelled in these cases agreed that the defendants were guilty of the crime
charged, they reached three entirely different results in assessing the penalty for each.
It is not contended that all the penalties should have been the same in type and length,
but the wide variation found in these cases demonstrates vividly the truth of the above
quoted paragraph from Judge Fisher's article, and the general inability of the jury to
select a penalty, except by accident, that is just and impartial.
24 Ex parte Marshall, 72 Tex. Crim. Rep. 83, 161 S. W. 112, 114 (1913). But see
Davis v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. Rep. 450, 455, 196 S. W. 520, 523 (1917), to the effect
that the fact that the jury might have rendered a more merciful verdict would not bring
the case within the province of the Court to set aside the verdict of the body which
under the Constitution is authorized to fix the punishment.
25 72 Tex. Crim. Rep. 83, 161 S. W. 112 (1913).
26 Tex. Laws 1913, c. 132, p. 262.
27 Tex. CONST. (1876) Art. I, § 15.
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statute to be invalid but on the ground that it violated Article 6 of
the Penal Code which provides "that a provision of the penal law
... so indefinitely framed or of such doubtful construction that it
cannot be understood, either from the language in which it is
expressed, or from some other written law of the State,... shall be
regarded as wholly inoperative." Undoubtedly, the statute as
framed was indefinite for there was no understandable provision
for its application to a penal statute which imposed a fine and
imprisonment. There was, therefore, no need for the Court to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the statute, 2  but it nevertheless stated
that the right of jury trial which was to be held inviolate is the same
right which existed at common law, and there was no such right at
common law to have the jury determine the punishment. It seems
that if the statute had provided merely that the penalty should be
fixed by the judge, without the provision as to the upper and lower
limits of the sentence which had to conform exactly with the
punishment in the penal statute under which the offender was
charged, it would have been held not to violate the statutory pro-
vision against indefiniteness. 9 That a transfer of the power to select
the penalty can be made has been accepted by the Court since the
decision in Ex parte Marshall in the case of Bolton v. State"' in
which the Court held that the statute, allowing the defendant
accused of a felony offense less than capital, who pleads guilty to
waive trial by jury, empowered the judge to assess the penalty.
'Is Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936). Mr. Justice
Brandeis in a concurring opinion said: "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter."
9 There was no need for the Court of Criminal Appeals to hold the act of the
Legislature invalid in this case inasmuch as the defendant was convicted under a penal
statute which imposed only the punishment of imprisonment and not a fine; therefore,
the indeterminate sentence law could have been applied without being held indefinite.
There is no doubt that it was indefinite and would have been so held in a later appropri-
ate case.
30 123 Tex. Crim. Rep. 543, 59 S. W. (2d) 833, 834 (1933).
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II
An alternative to the proposal for placing the power of selecting
the penalty in the judge is the suggestion that the punishment
should be determined by a board composed of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and sociologists or others especially equipped to
supervise the reform of the offender. There has been a tendency,
however, for proponents of this plan to emphasize, as the only
purpose of punishment, the reform of the criminal, which is the
secondary purpose of punishment in Texas in the light of Article
2 of the Penal Code and the interpretation which has been given
it. Therefore, it may be impossible to reconcile such suggestions
with the primary purpose of punishment in Texas, i.e., deterrence.
While Professor Sheldon Glueck has urged that the legislature im-
pose no penalties for the various crimes,' leaving the length of
detention and treatment of the offender entirely within the dis-.
cretion of the board, California has set up a similar system which
incorporates the proposal for the board, yet retaining the statutory
limitations as to the maximum and minimum period for detention.
The board, according to Glueck, would detain the offender for what-
ever length of time is required to effect the rehabilitation necessary
to insure desirable social behavior following his release. Under
such a system no definite term would be set at any time, the correc-
tion of the condition leading to criminal behavior being the only
prerequisite to release. Although the effectiveness of such a pro-
cedure does not yet seem certain, there is undoubtedly a place for
such a board of doctors and social scientists in the process in which
the term and the type of punishment are determined, whatever the
purpose of the punishment may be. It seems probable in view of
the necessary lag of public opinion behind developments in medical
learning and the social sciences, that any tendency toward further
employment of such a board would first be in connection with the
revising of punishments after assessment by the court an,] after
el See Glueck, Principles of a Rational Pend Code (1928) 41 14AaV. L. REv. 453, 473.
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sentence has begun. The power to assess the penalty can be
expected in the long run, however, to be left in the unspecialized
agency of the court, whether judge or jury, only until public
confidence in the knowledge of psychiatry and criminology has
been established and the accepted theory of punishment has been
modified. It is arguable that such a group would be considerably
better qualified even in the present state of the psychiatric and the
psychological sciences to pronounce a determinate sentence, even
for the primary purpose of suppressing crime, than either the judge
or the jury.
Assuming that such a board would come to be regarded as an
appropriate agency for fixing a determinate sentence, the question
would arise whether it should be hampered by legislative restric-
tions as to minimum and maximum periods of detention. It seems
that such legislation would be inconsistent with the theory justify-
ing the board and would unnecessarily restrict it in its function.
If the considerations which reflect upon the disqualifications of
the jury as a body to assess sentence are found to be persuasive,
the duty of fixing the punishment should devolve upon the judge
until the state is prepared to adopt the innovation of a board of
specialists for the performance of this function. Once the duty is
imposed by statute upon the judge rather than the jury, the formu.
lation of general principles for the guidance of judges in the
assessment of the sentence could well be undertaken by the
Conference of District Judges in Texas or some similar group
which might be formed in the future."
Randolph D. Hurt.
32 For further criticism of jury determination of the penalty see Note (1938) 24
VA. L. REV. 462.
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